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Abstract: It is often said that European cooperation on asylum has led to the development of 
‘Fortress Europe’, as asylum policies have become more restrictive and asylum seekers find it 
increasingly difficult to reach European territory and benefit from effective protection. There can 
be little doubt that there have been restrictive asylum policy trends in most, if not all, destination 
countries and there are many examples of how existing laws have failed asylum seekers in need 
of protection. We argue, however, that there is little evidence for the claim that steps towards a 
common European asylum policy have been responsible for, or exacerbated, such developments. 
On  the  contrary,  we  argue  that  European  cooperation  on  asylum  has  curtailed  regulatory 
competition among the Member States and that in doing so it has largely halted the race to the 
bottom in protection standards in the EU. Rather than leading to policy harmonisation at the 
‘lowest common denominator’, EU asylum laws have frequently led to an upgrading of domestic 
asylum laws in several Member States, strengthening protection standards for several groups of 
forced  migrants  even  in  those  cases  where  EU  laws  have  been  widely  criticised  for  their 
restrictive character.  It is reasonable to expect that the ongoing ‘communitarisation’ of asylum 
policy  will  improve  Member  States’  implementation  records  of  EU  asylum  law  and  further 





There is a widely held view that European cooperation in general and moves towards a common 
EU asylum policy in particular have had a negative impact on protection regimes in Europe, 
leading to more restrictive asylum policies and making it increasingly difficult for asylum seekers 
to reach European territory and benefit from effective protection. This has become known as the 
‘Fortress Europe’ thesis  (Geddes 2000; Luedtke forthcoming). This thesis argues on a theoretical 
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level that Member State cooperation on asylum and refugee matters has fostered restrictiveness 
through processes of ‘venue shopping’ (Guiraudon 2000; 2001), ‘securitisation’ (Huysmans 2000; 
Kostakopoulou  2000;  Bigo  2001)  and  the  legitimisation  of  ‘lowest  common  denominator 
standards’ (Guiraudon 2001; Lavenex 2001). On an empirical level, aspects of EU asylum and 
refugee policy have been criticized for their undermining of the rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees through the establishment of restrictive EU laws in areas such as ‘safe third country’ 
policy, detention and return policy. There can be little doubt that there have been restrictive 
asylum policy trends in most, if not all, destination countries and many examples of how existing 
laws have failed asylum seekers in need of protection. We argue, however, that there is little 
evidence for the argument that in Europe steps towards a common European asylum policy have 
been responsible for such restrictive developments. On the contrary, we argue that European 
cooperation in this area has curtailed regulatory competition and in doing so it has largely halted 
the  race  to  the  bottom  in  protection  standards  in  the  EU.  Rather  than  leading  to  policy 
harmonisation at the ‘lowest common denominator’, EU asylum laws have led to an upgrading of 
domestic asylum laws in several Member States, strengthening protection standards for groups of 
forced migrants even in the case of EU laws that have been widely criticised for their restrictive 
character. While there currently remain significant variations in Member States’ implementation 
of  EU  asylum  law,  we  expect  that  the  ongoing  ‘communitarisation’  of  asylum  policy  will 
improve  Member  States’  implementation  records  of  EU  asylum  law  and  strengthen  refugee 
protection outcomes in Europe.  
 
 
Theorising the Impact of European Cooperation on Asylum Policy 
 
There is near consensus among the relevant commentators with regard to the assessment of the 
impact of European cooperation on asylum and refugee policy since the start of such cooperation 
in the 1980s. The literature generally agrees that asylum policy harmonisation has resulted in 
increased  restrictions  of  access  to  asylum  procedures  and  weaker  procedural  safeguards 
(Hathaway 1993; Guiraudon 2000, Huysmans 2000, Boccardi 2002, Guild 2006). The theoretical 
frame that has been developed to account for the negative impact of European cooperation on 
refugee protection is seen as being based on three key dynamics:  1) the external restrictionism 
inherent  in  internal  market  liberalisation;  2)  the  ‘venue-shopping’  and  securitisation  logic  of 
European asylum policy making and 3) the legitimating cover that European cooperation provides 
for the restrictive initiatives of the Member States.  
    3 
First,  restrictive  measures  at  the  EU’s  external  border  are  often  seen  as  a  counterbalance  to 
internal liberalization.  The European Union’s asylum initiatives have often been seen as sitting 
somewhat uneasily with the overwhelmingly economic nature of the European integration project 
(Hathaway 1993; Lavenex 2000; Boccardi 2002; Guild 2006). Chalmers (2006: 606) notes that 
the common policy towards non-EU nationals ‘has been framed to a large extent by the economic 
benefits  or  costs  these  are  perceived  to  entail’.  As  a  result,  rather  than  undertaking  the 
construction of a European-wide protection space, cooperation on asylum issues was directed 
towards the adoption of compensatory measures which were to pave the way for the complete 
abolition  of  internal  border  checks.  Hathaway  was  one  of  the  first  scholars  emphasising  the 
discursive connection between the completion of the single market programme and the need for 
stricter controls when in 1993 he wrote: ‘European Community governments have seized upon 
the impending termination of immigration controls at the intra-Community borders to demand 
enhanced security at the Community’s external frontiers’ (Hathaway 1993: 719). 
   
Second, there have arguments based on the dynamics of venue-shopping and securitisation. A 
substantial body of work has developed exploring the way in which the emergence of asylum 
policy at the EU level has assisted national authorities in overcoming international and domestic 
constraints in their attempt to pursue restrictive policy goals. These constraints include national 
constitutions, jurisprudence and laws and, albeit to a lesser extent, international legal instruments 
and  courts  (Guiraudon  2000:  258-9;  Joppke;  Hansen).  Hathaway  (1993:  719)  writes: 
‘Collaborating within a covert network of intergovernmental decision-making bodies spawned by 
the economic integration process itself, governments have dedicated themselves to the avoidance 
of  national, international, and  supranational  scrutiny  grounded  in  the  human  rights  standards 
inherent  in  refugee  law’.  This,  he  argues,  'breaks  with  the  tradition  of  elaborating  norms  of 
refugee law in an open and politically accountable context’ (Hathaway 1993: 719). Guiraudon 
(2000: 252) has pursued this argument advancing the notion of ‘venue shopping’, which refers to 
the process by which strategic actors (such as security-minded interior ministry officials) seek 
venues of decision-making in which they are shielded from actors with other preferences. The 
early institutional design of European cooperation on refugee issues has been regarded as an 
essential factor contributing to the increased autonomy enjoyed by executive authorities. The 
inter-governmental origins of EU policy-making in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) resulted in 
an enduring marginalisation of supranational institutions, first under the Maastricht Third Pillar 
and subsequently under the transitional framework established by the Amsterdam Treaty, which 
has allowed Member States to shield their restrictive policy agenda against interference from   4 
actors  with  a  more  integrationist  or  humanitarian  view  of  immigration  and  asylum  issues 
(Hathaway 1993; Pollack 1999; Guiraudon 2000; Kostakopoulou 2000; Tallberg 2002). Different 
institutions may be more or less favourable towards particular policy frames (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993). In the asylum field, ‘[t]he image of migratory flows jeopardising internal security is 
often integrated into the vocabulary of law and order’ (Anderson 1995: 164-5). The argument 
here  is  that  the  institutional  dominance  of  JHA  officials  in  supranational  cooperation  has 
promoted the ‘securitisation’ of asylum and refugee issues at the EU level (see e.g. Guiraudon 
2000; Kostakopoulou 2000; Huysmans 2000; Bigo 2001). The conceptualisation of migration and 
asylum as potentially destabilising phenomena, in a similar fashion to terrorism and transnational 
crime, allows national security agencies to advance their traditional solutions – those of external 
border control and internal police surveillance.  
  
A third argument focuses on the impact that European cooperation is expected to have on the 
asylum systems of EU Member States, by legitimising the lowering of domestic standards. It is 
argued  that  national  officials  who  participate  in  EU  asylum  policy-making  can  legitimate 
restrictive  reforms  at  home  by  the  ‘need’  to  bring  national  policies  into  line  with  European 
initiatives (Joppke 1998; Lavenex 2000). According to Lavenex (2001: 861), the main impetus 
for restrictions in Europe has come from traditional destination countries, but EU cooperation has 
also contributed to limit liberal regimes in other receiving Member States in which asylum issues 
had  previously  been  less  politicised.  The  tightening  of  asylum  laws  in  one  country  has 
subsequently  led to  ‘snowball  effects’,  whereby  other Member  States  have felt  compelled to 
revise their policies in order not to become magnets for asylum seekers (Guiraudon 2001: 50). A 
number of commentators stress that, within the context of the abolition of internal border controls, 
this spiral of restrictionism has been reinforced by the adaptive pressures exerted from the EU 
level (Hathaway 1993; Lavenex 2001: 861-2; Guild 2006).  Moreover, Lavenex (1999: 73) points 
out that the opening up of the iron curtain led the EU Member States ‘to develop a vivid interest 
in tightening those newly liberalised borders’. The identification of Central and East European 
countries  (CEECs)  as  safe  third  countries  was  to allow  for the  de  facto transplantation  of  a 
restrictive EU asylum regime to the then candidate countries within the overarching context and 
with the help of the political leverage of the prospect of membership (Lavenex 1999; Byrne et al. 
2002).  
 
However, this theoretical account of the expected negative impact of European cooperation in this 
area  can  be  challenged.  It  also  needs  to  be  balanced  by  pointing  towards  some  important   5 
countervailing dynamics. First, a number of caveats to the account outlined above are necessary.  
We  might  ask,  for  example,  whether  we  should  necessarily  expect  a  quid  pro  quo  between 
internal  liberalisation  and  external  restrictiveness.  In  other  areas  of  the  Single  Market,  steps 
towards  the  free  movement  of  goods,  capital  and  services  have  (with  few  exceptions)  not 
undermined Europe’s general openness vis-à-vis the rest of the world. With regard to the idea of 
venue-shopping, one can point to  recent steps towards the communitarisation of EU asylum and 
refugee policy which has substantially increased transparency while broadening the participation 
of actors involved in asylum policy, reducing venue-shopping opportunities and securitisation 
dynamics (Boswell 2007). As for legitimising the lowering of domestic standards argument, one 
would of course expect such processes of legitimisation to occur despite the absence of explicit 
EU cooperation as states frequently refer to the policies of other countries in order to justify 
domestic reforms.   
 
Second, the adoption of common EU standards can be expected to limit regulatory competition 
and the ‘race to the bottom’ in protection standards. Public policy making on asylum takes place 
in an environment of extensive collective action problems (Suhrke 1998; Thielemann and Dewan 
2006). The relative distribution of asylum seekers across Europe has been highly volatile and 
uneven.  This  has  fuelled  regulatory  competition  as  states  have  sought  to  limit  their  relative 
responsibilities with regard to asylum seekers and refugees by adopting policy measures that were 
more restrictive than those of other states in their neighbourhood in an attempt to deflect asylum 
flows  to  these  other  countries.  Policy  harmonisation,  i.e.  the  setting  of  common  minimum 
European standards, are an effective way of putting an end to such regulatory competition and the 
continuous downgrading of protection standards. Moreover, Member States are at liberty to adopt 
higher  standards  than  those  outlined  in  the  EU  legislation.  As  stated in  the Preamble  to  the 
Procedures Directive, for example, ‘It is in the very nature of minimum standards that Member 
States  should  have  the  power  to  introduce  or  maintain  more  favourable  provisions  for  third 
country nationals or stateless persons who ask for international protection’ (Council Directive 
2005/85/EC).  Furthermore,  minimum  standards  legislation  customarily  contains  provisions 
(‘stand-still clauses’) prohibiting Member States from lowering their current domestic standards 
in the implementation of the Directive (Costello 2005: 53). 
 
Third, we do not expect that European cooperation will always lead to common policies that 
reflect standards at the level of the ‘lowest common denominator’ among the Member States.  
Instead, we expect (even under unanimity voting in the Council) that in many cases common   6 
polices will be adopted at levels which will require at least some Member States to upgrade their 
domestic policies. There are a number of institutional mechanisms that can explain this. One such 
mechanism is that of conditionality. It is often said that the EU enlargement process is the Union's 
most  effective  foreign  policy  tool  providing  it  with  considerable  leverage  over  the  domestic 
reform process in accession states. When a country seeks to become a new member of the EU, its 
government makes a commitment not only to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria but also to accept the 
entire existing acquis communitaire. This means that accession countries are required to adapt 
their domestic laws in preparation of membership (or closer ties with the EU more generally), a 
requirement known as conditionality (Smith 1998; Schimmelpfennig and Sedelmeier; Hughes, 
Sasse  and  Gordon  2004).  The  EU  asylum  acquis  constituted  an  important  element  in  the 
negotiations on accession of the Eastern European countries after the collapse of communism 
(Byrne, Noll and Vedsted-Hansen 2002; Vedsted-Hansen, Byrne and Noll 2004). Until the mid-
1990s Eastern European states, which had been sheltered by the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, 
had less developed domestic asylum systems for asylum-seekers and refugees than countries in 
Western Europe. As a result new EU Member States and those still in the accession process have 
been encouraged (and sometimes coerced) to upgrade their own domestic asylum systems in line 
with established international and EU protection standards. In addition to the 'hard' incentives that 
conditionality provides, 'soft' incentives also play a role in the evolution of domestic standards.  
Even without legal compliance and enforcement mechanisms, regulatory standard setting in the 
EU frequently involves the upgrading of domestic rules in some of the Member States. Low 
standard  states  frequently  agree  to  common  rules  that  reflect  the  higher  standards  of  other 
Member States as the experience with Single Market regulations has shown. Mechanisms for 
such dynamics include reputational concerns (Heritier 2001), policy learning (Dolowitz D. and D. 
Marsh  2001)  and  the  use  of  compensation  and  package  deals  (Thielemann  2005).  One  such 
compensation instrument is the European Refugee Fund (ERF),3 which distributes money from 
the common EU budget to encourage efforts of the Member States in receiving and bearing the 
consequences of receiving  refugees and displaced  persons (Thielemann  2005:  807–824). The 
recent Commission Green paper on the future of EU asylum policy is explicit about the Fund’s 
purpose, stating that 'ways must be explored to ensure ERF funding can be put to better use in 
order to complement, stimulate and act as a catalyst for the delivery of the objectives pursued, to 
reduce disparities and to raise standards (Commission 2007: 11). Even though questions have 
been raised about the ability of the ERF to fully achieve all its objectives given its currently small 
size and problematic allocation rules (Thielemann 2005), the Fund has transferred significant 
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resources and can be expected to have helped some countries to accept and finance adaptation to 
higher European standards.
4   
 
The Evolution of the Common European Asylum System  
 
Before  illustrating  how  European  cooperation  on  asylum  has  limited  regulatory  competition, 
halting the race to the bottom in protection standards as well as upgraded standards of protection 
in several Member States, it might be useful to remind ourselves of the principle legislative 
instruments adopted thus far in the process of the formulation of the Common European Asylum 
System.    
 
The  objective  of  the  Common  European  Asylum  System  (CEAS)  is  to  establish  a  common 
asylum procedure and a uniform protection status applicable throughout the European Union. 
These objectives were defined first in the Tampere Programme in 1999 and then confirmed and 
elaborated in the Hague Programme of 2004. The ‘ultimate objective’, as stated by the European 
Commission in its Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, is to create a 
‘level playing field, a system which guarantees to persons genuinely in need of protection access 
to a high level of protection under equivalent conditions in all Member States while at the same 
time dealing fairly and efficiently with those found not to be in need of protection’ (Green Paper 
on the future Common European Asylum System, Brussels, 6.6.2007 COM(2007) 301 final, 2).  
The first stage of the establishment of the CEAS was designed to result in the achievement of a 
set of minimum standards on specific areas of asylum policy applicable in the legal systems of all 
Member States. Four main legislative instruments have been adopted. These comprise Directive 
2003/9 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ L 31, 6.2.2003, 
p. 18), Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification of persons as refugees or 
those  in  need  of  subsidiary  protection  (Council  Directive  2004/83/EC  of  29  April  2004  on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons 
as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the 
protection granted (OJ L 304, 30.9.2004, p. 12), Directive 2005/85 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (O J L 326, 13.12.2005, 
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p.  13)  and  finally  the  Directive  on  common  standards  and  procedures  in  Member  States for 
returning  illegally  staying  third  country  nationals  (OJ  L  348,  24.12.2008,  p.  98).  All  four 
instruments will be analysed below.   
 
Assessing the impact of European Cooperation on Asylum Policies  
 
Ultimately, the question of the impact of European cooperation on asylum and refugee policy is 
an empirical one. The following section will analyse the EU’s four key legislative instruments 
that aim to harmonise European asylum policies. In each case, we will analyse the legislation’s 
purpose and remit, why certain aspects of the EU law have been criticised, and the extent to 
which  EU  provisions  have  weakened  or  strengthened  pre-existing  national  asylum  laws  and 
protection standards in the 27 Member States. It will be shown that although valid criticisms have 
been raised again EU asylum provisions, there is very little evidence to suggest that Member 
States’ pre-existing protection standards have been downgraded as EU law has been transposed at 
the national level. At the same time, there are numerous concrete examples of national asylum 
laws being forced to upgrade to comply with more stringent EU rules. 
 
a) The Reception Directive   
   
Traditionally, ‘states have strong reservations about granting important rights to asylum seekers 
because  no  final  decision  has  been  taken  yet  on  the  substantive  issue  of  their  application’ 
(Lambert, 1995, 103). Nevertheless, the Tampere Conclusions of 1999 provided that the Common 
European Asylum System should include the establishment of common minimum standards of 
reception conditions for asylum seekers (Tampere Presidency Conclusions, October 1999). In due 
course, the Council adopted Directive 2003/9/EC of 27
 January 2003 laying  down minimum 
standards  for  the  reception  of  asylum  seekers  (Reception  Directive),  now  binding  upon  the 
Member States, excluding Denmark and Ireland. The Directive was to be transposed by Member 
States  by  6  February  2005.  The  Preamble  to  the  Directive  states  that  it  seeks  to  lay  down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers ‘that will normally suffice to ensure them 
a dignified standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member States’ (Recital 7). 
The  objective  of  harmonising  the  conditions  of  reception  is  to  ‘help  to  limit  the  secondary 
movements of asylum seekers influenced by the variety of conditions for their reception’ (Recital 
8). 
 
Key criticisms   9 
 
As well as welcoming many of the Directive’s provisions, the UNHCR and others raised four key  
criticisms. First, the Directive applies only to those applicants making a request for ‘international 
protection’, which is to be understood as a claim under the 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 2 
(b)). UNHCR insists that an asylum application refers not only to a request for protection under 
the Refugee Convention, but also claims for subsidiary or complementary forms of protection and 
that these applicants should be guaranteed an equivalent level of protection to those applying for 
refugee status. Second, on the topic of ‘Residence and free movement’ of asylum seekers on 
Member  State  territory,  UNHCR  expressed  concern  at  the  wide  scope  for  discretion  in 
implementation of the Directive. Article 7(1) states that ‘Asylum seekers may move freely within 
the territory of the host Member State [emphasis added]’ and Article 7(2) provides that ‘Member 
States may decide on the residence of the asylum seeker for reasons of public interest, public 
order,  or  when  necessary,  for  the  swift  processing  and  effective  monitoring  of  his  or  her 
application’. UNHCR noted that the ‘may’ clauses in this article could lead to the implementation 
id many exceptions by Member States. The UNHCR regretted the inclusion of Article 16 on the 
‘Reduction or withdrawal of reception conditions’, which allows Member States to ‘withdraw 
reception conditions’ in cases were an asylum seeker ‘abandons the place of residence determined 
by the competent authority’ or where she ‘does not comply with reporting duties or with requests 
to provide information or to appear for personal interviews concerning the asylum procedure’ 
(Article 16(1)(a)). UNHCR stated that cases of abuse of a states’ asylum system should be dealt 
with through the established asylum procedure and not through alterations in reception conditions. 
The protection of human dignity is to be ensured for all individuals, including asylum seekers 
who have breached measures related to the processing of their claims (UNHCR, 2003). Third, the 
Directive permits Member States to use vouchers as a means of providing material reception 
conditions. UNHCR expressed reservations with regard to voucher systems ‘due to the observed 
prejudices  and  discrimination  against  asylum-seekers  who  are  obliged  to  use  vouchers  for 
shopping’ (UNHCR, 2003). Fourth, of particular concern to the UNHCR was also Article 16(2) 
which permits Member States to ‘refuse conditions in cases where an asylum seeker has failed to 
demonstrate that the asylum claim was made as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in that 
Member State’. The UNHCR stated that this provision ‘may constitute an obstacle for asylum-
seekers to have access to fair asylum procedures’ who ‘may lack basic information on the asylum 
procedure and be unable to state their claims formally or intelligibly without adequate guidance 
(including  legal  advice  and  representation).  These  difficulties  would  be  exacerbated  where   10 
asylum-seekers arrive with insufficient means and are denied assistance through rigid application 
of the “reasonably practicable” criteria’ (UNHCR, 2003).       
 
While these criticisms show that the provisions of the reception directive did not go as far as 
some human rights advocates had hoped, there is little in these critiques to suggest that EU law 
constitutes a down grading of existing national standards.  Article 4 explicitly permits Member 
States ‘to introduce or retain more favourable provisions in the field of reception conditions’.  
Moreover, it will be shown below that key elements of the reception directive have triggered an 
upgrading  of  domestic  standards  during  the  transposition  process  of  the  directive  in  several 
Member States.   
 
How the Reception Directive has strengthened aspects of refugee protection in relation to 
previous domestic standards 
 
To what extent does EU law on reception conditions reflect the lowest common denominator of 
standards that previously existed in the Member States?  Or is there evidence of EU standards in 
the area of reception that are higher than in some Member States?  The task of agreeing common 
minimum standards for harmonisation of reception conditions was always going to be difficult. 
As  Nicola  Rogers  has  noted,  achieving  adequately  high  standards  which  secure  humane 
conditions  for  all  asylum  applicants  ‘is  largely  dependent  on  the  Member  States  making 
compromises in areas of social law which to date they, they have long jealously guarded’ (Rogers, 
2002, 216).To assess the impact of the reception directive on national law, a various comparative 
studies on the transposition of the Directive have been carried out (Odysseus Academic Network 
2006; COM(2007) 745 final). 
 
The  Odysseus  Network  has  noted that  the  Reception  Directive  ‘led to  the  adoption  of  more 
favourable provisions at national level than the ones applicable before its adoption in 10 Member 
States’ (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 11). In Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, 
Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Portugal,  Slovenia  and  to  a  lesser  extent  Finland,  Hungary  and 
Slovakia, the study determined that the Directive led to the legal rules on reception conditions 
becoming ‘more clear and precise’. This was particularly the case with regard to provisions on the 
definition of vulnerable groups and provisions on unaccompanied minors, access to the labour 
market in Estonia, Hungary Luxembourg, Slovenia and Poland, access to healthcare in Latvia and 
Slovenia, education of the children of asylum seekers in Latvia (Odysseus Academic Network,   11 
2006, 112). Asylum seekers have been given the opportunity to enter the labour market in Estonia, 
France, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia pursuant to the implementation of the Directive, while in 
Spain, the procedure for asylum seekers to receive work permits has been simplified (Odysseus 
Academic Network, 2006, 112-3). For child asylum seekers, their right to access education has 
been clarified in Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia following the transposition of the Directive. The 
Netherlands is slowly raising the level of welfare benefits and in France, asylum seekers ‘in-
waiting’ are benefit from temporary allocations of welfare pursuant to implementation. The report 
notes an unexpected positive outcome of implementation in Malta, where Article 11(1), which 
states that ‘Member States shall determine a period of time, starting from the date on which an 
application for asylum was lodged, during which an applicant shall have access to the labour 
market’, has been interpreted as an obligation to release an asylum seeker from detention after 
one year in order to allow them the opportunity to work (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 
113). 
 
The report concludes quite clearly that in Belgium, Estonia, Spain, France, Hungary, Latvia, 
Portugal, Malta, The Netherlands and Slovakia, the transposition of the Directive ‘led to the 
adoption of more favourable provisions than those applicable before its transposition’. While 
access to employment improved in Estonia, Spain, France, Latvia, Greece and Slovakia, for the 
other countries, advances were made on the following points: 
 
-  an increased awareness of the special needs of asylum seekers and of the limits to the 
administration’s discretionary power in Hungary 
-  a better guarantee of material reception conditions in Portugal 
-  asylum seekers in Belgium were better informed 
-  family unification in the Netherlands 
-  access to education for the children of asylum seekers in Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia 
-  a review of the welfare benefits system (amount of benefits provided in the Netherlands 
and the length of provision in France) 
-  legal aid for asylum seekers in Lithuania 
-  access to healthcare in Lithuania 
(Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 114). 
 
The Odysseus study concluded that the Directive ‘did not have “perverse effects” of a lowering of 
higher national standards as would have been possible in the absence of a standstill clause’ except   12 
in Austria and in the United Kingdom where the report states that ‘only a few elements of a 
(potentially) restrictive nature have been introduced’. These consist of limitations on access to 
employment in Austria and harsher penalties in the UK (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 
114). Only one Member State, Slovakia, is found to be ‘a clear case of reduction of the reception 
conditions’  following  transposition  (Odysseus  ,  Academic  Network,  2006,  114-5).  However, 
generally the positive impact of the Directive is more visible in the new Member States than in 
the old ones. As mentioned above, in Malta there were no reception condition measures in place 
prior to the adoption of the Directive (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 111). The Odysseus 
Network concluded that ‘the progress accomplished at national level is due to the action of the 
European Community, which has contributed positively to International Refugee Law with the 
Directive on reception conditions complementary to the Geneva Convention’ since the latter is 
principally concerned with recognised refugees. The report states that ‘the positive effects of its 
transposition overshadow its negative effects’ (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 114). Further, 
the Network stated that ‘this positive evaluation contradicts the simplistic criticism often levelled 
at the Directive regarding its level of standards without bearing in mind the extremely diverse 
situation across the Member States’ (Odysseus Academic Network, 2006, 11). 
 
b) The Qualification Directive 
 
The Qualifications Directive sets out the rules and principles to be applied by Member States in 
their identification of refugees and those deserving of subsidiary protection status. The Directive, 
having been adopted at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 29 April 2004, entered into force 
on 20 October 2004 and its deadline for transposition was 10 October 2006. The ‘main objective’ 
of the Directive is stated in the Preamble as being ‘to ensure that Member States apply a common 
criteria for the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection, and…to 
ensure that a minimum level of benefits is available for these persons in all Member States’ 
(Recital  6,  Qualification  Directive).  Disparities  in  the  legislation  and  legal  practice  of  EU 
Member States have meant that a refugee’s chances of finding protection can vary dramatically 
from  one  Member  State  to  another.  According  to  Vice-President  Franco  Frattini,  the  former 
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, the Directive should reduce “the current great 
variances in recognition rates between Member States”
5 and end what some have called the EU’s 
‘asylum lottery’
6.   
                                                 
5 Europa press release, IP/06/1345, Brussels, 10 October 2006. 




Critiques of the Directive have highlighted two elements of the Directive which have been seen 
as  having  the  potential  to  undermine  existing  protection  standards.  These  are  provisions  on 
‘internal protection alternative’ and the so-called ‘exclusion clauses’.   
 
According to the UNHCR, ‘Article 8 of the Qualification Directive omits what is considered by 
UNHCR, legal experts and States party to the 1951 Convention to be an essential, and even pre-
conditional, requirement of an internal protection alternative, i.e. that the proposed location is 
practically, safely and legally accessible to the applicant’ (UNHCR 2007:10).
7  The Directive 
therefore allows Member states to refer to internal protection alternatives even when, due to 
technical obstacles, applicants cannot actually return to the region which is deemed safe. In such 
cases applicants are often granted only a ‘tolerated’ status with restricted social rights (Elena 
2008:5). Even though the UNHCR found that several Member States had not transposed the 
Directive’s provisions concerning internal protection alternatives (UNHCR 2007: 10), the fact 
remains that these provisions appear out of line with the established jurisprudence of States party 
to the 1951 Convention and recent case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
8   
 
The other main criticism of the Directive concerns provisions to exclude asylum seekers from 
refugee  status  (Articles  12  and  14).  Article  14  creates  a  distinction  between  exclusion  and 
revocation of status, and uses it to permit states to conflate the Convention grounds for exclusion 
with expulsion. These provisions allow Member States to adopt dangerously broad interpretations 
of  what  constitutes  a  “serious  non-political  crime”  that  can  lead  to  exclusion.  Critics  are 
concerned that Member States will use Article 14 to improperly exclude people from refugee 
recognition based on criteria that lead only to expulsion under the Convention (Elena 2008: 7).  
According to the UNHCR, existing standards for application of the exclusion clauses have been 
eroded by the Directive (UNHCR 2007: 13). 
 
How the Qualification Directive has strengthened aspects of refugee protection in relation to 
previous domestic standards 
                                                 
7 UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: ‘Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative’ within 
the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 23 July 2003, at: http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3f28d5cd4.pdf.  
8 Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, ECHR, Application No. 1948/04, 11 January 2007.   14 
 
Despite the above criticism, even among the most vocal critiques the assessment of the impact of 
the Qualifications Directive has in parts been very positive. The introduction of more detailed 
rules  of  evidentiary  assessment  and  a  clearer  definition  of  persecution  have  been  widely 
welcomed. Transposition also significantly advanced standards in some Member States where 
non-state actors of persecution were recognised for the first time, or subsidiary protection was 




The Directive’s provisions on subsidiary protection have been welcomed (UNHCR 2007: 11).  
They represent the first supranational legislation in Europe defining qualification for subsidiary 
protection, and create an obligation to grant this status to those who qualify. Many EU Member 
States had pre-existing national provisions to afford individuals some form of complementary 
protection status.  However, large variations existed as to the scope and the rights attached to this 
status. The  Qualification  Directive  sets  minimum  standards  for  the  definition  and  content  of 
subsidiary protection status.  As is the case for other provisions of EU asylum law, Member 
States may maintain or introduce standards more favourable to the applicant (UNHCR 2007: 66).    
The Directive strengthens existing refugee law in its attempts to define persecution by providing a 
non-exhaustive list of persecutory acts, including ‘acts of sexual violence’(Article 9(2)(a)) and 
‘acts of a gender-specific nature’ (Article 9(2)(f)) neither of which are found in the Refugee 
Convention  though  the  law  has  developed  gradually  in  recognition  of  the  need  to  protect 
individuals from return to such treatment. Teitgen-Colly has stated that, alongside the reference to 
the ECHR in Article 9(1)(a), their inclusion ‘demonstrates the intention of the Union to allow for 
forms of persecution which, although they are not new, have not always been considered as such’ 
(Teitgen-Colly; 2006, 1530). 
   
Moreover, the Directive introduces a completely new aspect into the scope of refugee law by 
widening the scope for subsidiary protection to cases in which there is a ‘serious and individual 
threat  to  a  civilian’s  life  or  person  by  reason  of  indiscriminate  violence  in  situations  of 
international or internal armed conflict’ (Article 15c). According to Teitgen-Colly, ‘individual’ 
has to be ‘understood as a requirement for personal or individual threats, meaning threats likely to 
create  subjective  fears  in  each  person  exposed  to  them’  (Teitgen-Colly;  2006,1529).  The 
development here is the absence of a requirement of a discriminating factor for the perpetration of   15 
the  violence.  Perhaps  more  importantly,  it is the lowering  of the required threshold  level  of 
‘severe violation’ to ‘serious harm’ that creates the potential for a real widening of the scope of 
protection for those seeking asylum in Europe.  
 
The Qualification Directive has also been praised for recognising the fact that persons fleeing the 
indiscriminate  effects  of  violence  associated  with  armed  conflicts,  but  who  do  not  fulfil  the 
criteria of the 1951 Convention, nevertheless require international protection (UNHCR 2007: 81). 
It has initiated an approximation of criteria for the recognition of subsidiary protection status.
9 
Finally, the transposition of the Qualification Directive has resulted in a subsidiary protection 
status for the first time in countries such as the Slovak Republic. In doing so, the Directive has 




In  the  area  of  non-state  persecution,  the  Qualification  Directive  again  goes  further  than  the 
Refugee  Convention.  Before  the  adoption  of  the  Directive,  the  issue  of  who  can  perpetrate 
persecution  for  the  purposes  of  refugee  recognition  was  possibly  the  clearest  example  of 
differences in legal interpretation amongst the Member States. All EU states agreed that state or 
de facto authorities, who control the whole or a significant part of the territory, could be agents of 
persecution. However, whilst most Member States went further and also recognized non-State 
actors  as  agents  of  persecution  if  the  state  was  unwilling  or  unable  to  provide  protection,  a 
minority of Member States (including Germany and France) only accepted persecution by non-
State actors where the persecution was instigated, condoned or tolerated by the State, i.e. in cases 
where the state could be shown to be complicit in the persecution and/or unwilling to provide 
protection.  Hence,  a  minority  of  states  would  deny  refugee  status  where  a  person  risked 
persecution by non-state actors and the state was simply unable to provide protection, or where no 
state authorities existed to provide protection.
10 
 
The Qualification Directive, sought to ensure a common concept of the sources of persecution 
and serious harm (Recital 18). In line with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
                                                 
9 See ECJ judgement Elgafaji, 
http://www.cir-onlus.org/C0465_2007_EN_0%5B2%5D.pdf 
10 Germany had the most restrictive interpretation. See Klug, A., 50 Jahre Genfer Flüchtlingskonvention - 
Flüchtlingsrechtliche Relevanz der ‘nichtstaatlichen’ Verfolgung in Bürgerkriegen - die Rechtsprechung 
des BVerwG im Vergleich zur Praxis anderer europäischer Staaten. NVwZ-Beilage I 2001, 67.   16 
Rights  and  the  guidance  of  UNHCR,  the  Qualification  Directive  clarifies  that  actors  of 
persecution or serious harm include non-State actors if it can be demonstrated that the State is 
either unable or unwilling to provide protection.  The inclusion of non-state actors of persecution 
in the Qualification Directive has broadened the refugee definition in countries that previously 
did  not  provide  protection  against  such  persecution.  This  has  allowed  ‘increased  protection 
against groups such as clans, tribes, criminal organisations, rebel groups, and perpetrators of 
domestic violence’ (Elena 2008: 5).  
 
According to the UNHCR, ‘the Qualification Directive has resulted in much greater conformity 
of legal interpretation on non-State actors of persecution or serious harm […]. The shift to a focus 
on the availability of protection, rather than the actor of persecution or serious harm, should be 
commended.  -  In  France and  Germany,  the  Directive  has  enlarged the  scope  of  grounds  for 
granting  protection  and  thereby  reinforced  the  protection  system.’  (UNHCR  2007:  9)    In 
Germany, the introduction of the concept of non-State actors of persecution is widely seen as 
having enlarged the scope of protection.  This is reflected in the sharp rise in decisions by the 
authorities granting refugee status to Somalis since this provision has entered into force under 
German law (UNHCR 2007: 46).  
 
c) The Procedures Directive 
 
The Procedures Directive was formally adopted on the 1 December 2005. The 1999 Tampere 
Presidency  Conclusions  had  called  for  the  formulation  of  ‘common  standards  for  a  fair  and 
efficient asylum procedure’. Asylum procedures relate to the processing of asylum applications. 
The key elements that fall under the topic of asylum procedures include the question of access to 
procedures,  procedural  guarantees  such  as  the  opportunity  to  communicate  with  the  relevant 
authorities, access to an appeal process as well as the procedure for the withdrawal of refugee 
status. In due course, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive on minimum 
standards on asylum procedures in Member States (2001 OJ C62 E/231). Under Article 67 EC, 
the Council’s voting on the proposal was to be on the basis of unanimity, with the European 
Parliament being consulted. At Tampere, the European Council emphasised its absolute respect 
for the right to seek asylum. This is expressed in the Preamble to the Procedures Directive, which 
affirms the EU’s commitment to its international responsibilities, stating that in agreeing to create 
the CEAS in line with its obligations under the Refugee Convention, the EU was ‘thus affirming 
the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution’ (Recital 8).   17 
It  is  also  proclaimed  that  ‘[t]his  Directive  respects  the  fundamental  rights  and  observes  the 
principles recognised in particular by the [European Charter]’ (Recital 8), which recognises the 




Much criticism asserting a breach of the EU’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, and of 
its obligations under international human rights law, has been railed against the Directive. In 2004, 
a coalition of non-governmental organisations demanded that the Directive be withdrawn, noting 
‘with deep regret that the most contentious provisions are all intended to deny asylum seekers 
access to asylum procedures and to facilitate their transfer to countries outside the EU’ (ECRE et 
al., 2004). In addition, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees strongly asserted his opposition 
to  the  Directive,  warning  that  ‘several  provisions...would  fall  short  of  accepted  international 
standards…jeopardizing  the  lives  of  future  refugees’  (UNHCR,  2004).  Furthermore, 
condemnation of the Directive has come from within the EU institutions, most vehemently from 
the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2000). 
 
The Directive has been criticised on a number of grounds. A major concern is related to its use 
and expansion of the ‘safe country’ concept (Costello, 2005). All three derivative concepts, the 
‘first country of asylum’ (Article 26), the ‘safe third country’ (Article 27) and the ‘safe country of 
origin’  (Article  31),  feature  in  the  Directive  and  Article  36  introduces  a  new  notion  of  a 
‘European safe third country’ whereby applicants arriving from designated non-EU, European 
countries, having ‘entered illegally’ or are ‘seeking to enter’ a Member State illegally, may be 
refused access to asylum procedures. 
 
In a report on the Procedures Directive published in 2006, ECRE criticised not only the standards 
of the Directive, but also its language for being at times ‘incoherent and ambiguous’ (ECRE, 
2006, 2). It raised particular concerns regarding certain provisions, including the restriction on the 
right to remain in the state pending examination of the application to first instance decisions 
(Article 7), and the non-suspensive effects of appeals (Article 39), the restrictions on the right to 
an interpreter (Article 10(1)(b)), the wide scope for the application of accelerated procedures 
(Article 23(4)) to ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims (Article 28(2)), the discretion given to states to 
derogate  from  the  basic  principles  and  guarantees  of  Chapter  II  (Article  24),  which  include 
guarantees such as a right for applicants to be informed ‘in a language which they may reasonably   18 
be supposed to understand’ of their rights and obligations in relation to the asylum procedure to 
be followed (Article 10(a)), the right to an interpreter ‘for submitting their case to the competent 
authorities whenever necessary’ (Article 10(b)), the right to ‘communicate with the UNHCR’ 
(Article  10(c)),  the  right  to  be  ‘given  notice  in  reasonable  time’  on  the  outcome  of  their 
application (Article 10(d)) and the right to be informed of this result ‘in a language that they may 
reasonably  be  supposed  to  understand’  (Article  10(e)).  ECRE  also  voiced  concern  over  the 
permitting  of  border  procedures  in  Article  35(2)  which  derogate  from  the  principles  and 
guarantees of Chapter II outlined above and which permit confinement at the border without the 
possibility of judicial review for up to four weeks (Article 35(4)) (ECRE, 2006, 4-5).   
 
How the Procedures Directive has strengthened refugee protection in relation to earlier 
domestic standards 
 
The ‘safe third country’ provisions in the Directive can be seen as having undergone rights-
enhancement  during  the  negotiations  on  the  Directive,  which  puts  a  question  mark  on  the 
prevalent views in the literature that allege the overall rights-restricting nature of the Directive. 
Concerns voiced by UNHCR and shared by the Commission ‘and in particular one Member 
State’ were voiced in relation to the safe third country notion. (UNHCR; 1997, 29) As Doede 
Ackers reports, ‘There were drafting sessions which resulted in considerably improving the text 
on rules with respect to the individual consideration in safe third country cases’. Initially the text 
provided only that Member States were obliged to lay down “rules setting out the matters which 
shall  be  the  subject  of  an  individual  examination”’.  Eventually,  it  evolved  into  “rules,  in 
accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination [as to] whether the third 
country  concerned  is  safe  for  a  particular  applicant,  which,  as  a  minimum,  shall  permit  the 
applicant to challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds that he/she 
would be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”’ (D. Ackers; 
2005, 30). 
 
Further,  the  Commission  presented  some  points  demonstrating  that  there  are  some  rights-
enhancing  aspects  to  the  Directive.  It  stated  that  the  first  instance  procedures  are  fully  in 
accordance with the essential rights provided for in Section 192 of the UNHCR Handbook on 
procedures and criteria for determining refugee status (1979) (D. Ackers; 2005, 32). What is more, 
on appeal, the provisions it includes on judicial scrutiny go beyond the Handbook in requiring 
Member States to ensure an effective remedy before a court or tribunal. The Handbook only   19 
refers to ‘a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different authority, 
whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system’. 
 
In  a  report  published  by  the  Refugee  Council  in  2007  on  the  UK’s  implementation  of  the 
Procedures Directive, a number of provisions of the Procedures Directive are highlighted as being 
welcome improvements on the standard of refugee protection in Europe. Although the Refugee 
Council finds a number of areas for concern, it is not possible to conclude from the report that the 
overall impact of the Directive is negative. The Refugee Council welcomes Article 8 on the 
‘Requirements for the examination of applications’. Article 8(1) states that ‘Member States shall 
ensure that applications for asylum are neither rejected nor excluded from examination on the 
sole ground that they have not been made as soon as possible’. The Refugee Council reflected 
positively on the level of expertise required of asylum decision makers in the Directive. Article 
8(2)(b) requires Member States to ensure that ‘precise and up-to-date information is obtained 
from various sources, such as the [UNHCR], as to the general situation prevailing in the countries 
of origin of applicants for asylum’. The Refugee Council make clear that the standards of the 
Directive would require an improvement of standards in the UK. Article 8(1) for example, states 
that ‘Member States shall ensure that applications for asylum are neither rejected nor excluded 
from examination on the sole ground that they have not been made as soon as possible’. The 
Refugee Council welcomed the UK government’s ‘intention to amend the Immigration Rules to 
reflect’ the requirements of this provision’ (Refugee Council, 2007, 4). 
 
The Refugee Council’s report on the UK’s implementation of the Procedures Directive highlights 
the importance of the implementation stage in order to determine the actual impact of the asylum 
Directives on refugee protection in Europe. Much rests on the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Directive as to whether they result in an upgrading of domestic standards. For example, the 
Refugee Council, commenting on the UK’s Implementation Paper on the Procedures Directive 
expresses concern at the British Immigration Authority’s opinion that asylum seeking children are 
to be looked after by local authorities and that this apparently consists of a fulfilment of the UK’s 
obligations under Article 17(1)(a), which requires Member States to ensure that ‘a representative 
represents  and/or  assists  the  unaccompanied  minor  with  respect  to  the  examination  of  the 
application’. The Refugee Council noted the inadequacy of leaving this task to local authorities, 
which ‘feel unable to recommend one legal representative over another’ due to ‘the requisite 
experience, and/or training, as well as a duty to remain impartial regarding signposting to private 
companies without a competitive tendering process’ (Refugee Council, 2007, 7). It is perhaps in   20 
such cases that the role of the European Court of Justice will be important in ensuring the correct 
and uniform interpretation and application of the Directives across the Member States. 
 
The  Refugee  Council’s  report  on  the  UK’s  implementation  of  the  Procedures  Directive 
demonstrates that despite the inclusion of exceptions to guarantees, these are by no means made 
use  of  by  states.  For  example,  the  Refugee  Council  welcomed  the  British  Immigration 
Authority’s  decision  ‘not  to  make  use  of  the  exemptions  to  the  obligation  to  appoint  a 
representative’ as well as the Immigration Rules reflection of ‘existing policy to make it clear that 
interviews of unaccompanied children must only be conducted by specially trained Case Owners’ 
and that decisions are also taken by such individuals (Refugee Council, 2007, 7). It is clear 
therefore that the inclusion of derogations and possibilities for lowering standards present in the 
Directive have not necessarily been taken advantage of by states during implementation, as was 
feared by many when the Directive was agreed. 
 
Despite the assertion from a number of NGOs, including Amnesty International and ECRE, as 
well as many academic commentators that Member States with higher standards of protection are 
now free to lower their standards pursuant to the agreement of the Directive, Ackers points out 
that ‘the negotiations have not indicated that Member States have considered that this is an option 
for them. Most Member States attempted to make the text reflect what they were doing at the 
time…Moreover,  it  must  be  conceded  that  several  Member  States  will  have  to  raise  their 
standards to comply with certain’ of the Directive’s provisions (D. Ackers; 2005, 32). Moreover, 
it is clear that at the stage of implementation, the Directive has required the improvement of 
standards in some areas and that Member States have not necessarily taken advantage of the 
opportunities for derogation provided for in the Directive.     
 
d) The Return Directive 
 
 
The Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third country nationals (‘the Directive’) was approved by the European Parliament on 18 
June 2008, formally adopted by the Council on 9 December 2008 and published in the Official 
Journal on 24 December 2008. The Directive applies to all EU Member States except the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.
11 It also covers Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
                                                 
11 In accordance with Article 5 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty of the 
European   21 
 
The  Return  Directive
12 is  the  most  ambitious  asylum  instrument  that  the  EU  has  adopted 
concerning return until now. It is also the first major legal instrument on migration to be adopted 
by co-decision and therefore has been described as a ‘test case’ of how the procedure will work in 
this policy area (Canetta 2007: 446). The Directive provides for a set of rules to be applied 
throughout the return and removal process, for example concerning the form of the relevant 
decisions, the use of coercive measures, detention, safeguards pending return, etc. A number of 
provisions  included  in  the  legislation  have  been  assessed  very  negatively  by  civil  society 
organisations, in particular its rules on detention and entry bans (see e.g. Amnesty International 




Deprivation of liberty constitutes an extreme sanction, which is usually used in connection with 
the punishment of criminal offences (ECRE 2005; Hailbronner 2007). The Returns Directive has 
been criticised for doing little to harmonise Member States’ standards as regards administrative 
detention, establishing disproportionate maximum deadlines and allowing for the detention of 
children (UNHCR 2008; Amnesty International and ECRE 2008). Although Member States are 
required to lay down a maximum deadline for detention which should not exceed six months, the 
directive allows for the possibility of extending this period for up to 12 months in the event of 
uncooperative  behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  person  concerned  or  when  there  are  delays  in 
obtaining documentation from third countries. This maximum period has been viewed by many as 
excessive and a potential breach of the human rights of individuals who have not committed a 
crime.    The  fact  that  children  and  families  can  be  detained  (Article  17),  albeit  under  some 
additional safeguards, has also attracted criticism.  
 
The rules on the establishment of entry bans have also been strongly criticised, since they may 
impair  the  ability  of  individuals  to  seek  and  enjoy  protection  from  persecution  in  the  EU 
(UNHCR  2005,  2008;  Amnesty  International  and  ECRE  2008).  Article  11  of  the  Returns 
Directive provides for a mandatory entry ban when no period for voluntary departure has been 
granted or if the obligation to return has not been complied with. In other cases, Member States 
                                                                                                                                                 
Union, this Member State will decide within a period of six months from the adoption of the Directive 
whether 
to implement it in its national law. 
12 Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008. Official Journal L348/98.   22 
have discretion to decide whether to issue an entry ban or not. The maximum duration of the 
prohibition of re-entry is to be five years, unless the person concerned represents a threat to 
public policy, public security or national security, in which cases it can be extended (Article 11.2). 
Member  States  remain  free  to  refrain  from  adopting,  withdraw  or  suspend  entry  bans  in 
individual cases for humanitarian reasons, as well as to withdraw or suspend them on individual 
basis or for certain categories of cases for other reasons (Article 11.3). Individuals are to be 
granted an effective remedy to appeal against an entry ban, although not necessarily before a 
court (Article 13.1).  
 
How  the  Return  Directive  has  strengthened  aspects  of  refugee  protection  in  relation  to 
previous domestic standards 
 
Member  States  have  increasingly  resorted  to  detention  with  a  view  to  facilitate  the  removal 
process  –  also  in  the  case  of  asylum  seekers  -  throughout  the  EU  (ECRE  2005;  European 
Parliament  2005;  Hailbronner  2005,  2007).  Apart  from  this  general  trend,  however,  national 
practices  concerning  administrative  detention  have  shown  considerable  diversity  (IOM  2004; 
Hailbronner  2005).  Whilst  some  Member  States  do  not  generally  hold  asylum  claimants  in 
custody during the procedure (e.g. Germany), others allow for the detention of asylum seekers 
simply on the grounds of irregular entry (e.g. Malta). The maximum length of detention also 
varies  widely.  Seven  Member  States  did  not  have  in  place  any  time  limits  for  pre-removal 
detention. In the remaining Member States, detention deadlines have ranged from 32 days in 
France  to  20  months  in  Latvia  (Hailbronner  2005;  European  Parliament  2007;  JRS  2007). 
Although national legislation generally provides that the confinement of returnees should take 
place in special facilities, different to those in which ordinary prisoners are detained, this is not 
always the case in practice or in all EU countries – in Ireland, for example, returnees are regularly 
held in prisons (Hailbronner 2005: 144). Significant differences also prevail in the Member States 
as for whether the detention of vulnerable groups, such as minors, is allowed (Hailbonner 2005; 
European Parliament 2005). The Directive subjects detention to the principle of proportionality, 
providing that deprivation of liberty is justified ‘only to prepare return or carry out the removal 
process and when the application of less coercive measures would not be sufficient’ (Recital 16). 
Detention orders that are not issued by judicial authorities have to provide for the possibility of 
judicial review, although no deadlines are specified (Article 15.2). Custody should be maintained 
by as short a period as possible, and only as long as removal arrangements are in progress and 
executed ‘with due diligence’ (Article 15.1).   23 
 
Member States also tend to impose entry bans as a means of reducing the ability of migrants to 
enter their territory again after they have been expelled. On these grounds, the EMN (2007: 25) 
has described entry bans as ‘[t]he most effective and sustainable measure of Forced Return’. 
Current national practices prohibit returnees from coming back to the host Member State for 
variable  periods,  which  generally  last several  years  (EMN  2007:  25).  National  authorities  in 
Austria,  Denmark,  France,  Germany,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  the  UK  have  the  possibility  of 
prohibiting re-entry indefinitely – although their domestic legislation also provides for shorter 
bans. In Belgium, the Czech Republic, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain entry bans can last up 
to 10 years, whereas in other Member States, such as Malta and The Netherlands, such bans do 
not exist (IOM 2004). In Germany, Italy and Greece transgressing an entry ban constitutes a 
criminal offence which may be punished with imprisonment.13 The grounds for withdrawing 
such bans vary across countries, but tend to be restrictive. In Belgium, for example, re-entry is in 
principle  only  allowed if the  alien  meets  the  costs of  removal.14 Again,  like  with  the  other 
Directives, Member States can adopt or maintain more favourable provisions, as long as these are 
compatible with the legislation. A statement by the Council annexed to the text at the moment of 
adoption also declares that the implementation of the Directive will not be used in itself to justify 
the lowering of domestic standards. 
 
In summary, while there are powerful constraints on the downgrading of existing standards in the 
Member States, we can expect several protection-enhancing dynamics from the adoption of the 
Directive. In states where currently entry bans can last indefinitely, Member States will have to 
change their national legislations in order to establish upper time limits. Moreover, in several 
states will be forced to change their rules on re-entry bans to shorten the maximum period of 





In  this  paper  we  have  sought  to  question  the  argument  that  European  cooperation  has  been 
responsible for the decline in refugee protection standards and the creation of ‘Fortress Europe’.  
We have shown theoretically and empirically how European cooperation and the development of 
                                                 
13 EMN (2007), country reports on Germany, Italy and Greece.  
14 EMN (2007), country report on Belgium.    24 
the  common  asylum  law  on  the  basis  of  EU  minimum  standards  in  this  area  has  curtailed 
regulatory competition and in doing so it has largely halted the race to the bottom in protection 
standards  in  the  EU.    Rather  than  leading  to  policy  harmonisation  at  the  ‘lowest  common 
denominator’, EU asylum laws have frequently led to an upgrading of domestic asylum laws in 
several Member States, strengthening protection standards for several groups of forced migrants, 
even in the case of EU laws that have been widely criticised for their restrictive character.  While 
many aspects of EU asylum law reflect restrictive trends similar to those in other parts of the 
world, some EU provisions have clearly had a positive impact not only on countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe, but also in some of the older Member States.  While there currently remain 
significant variations in Member States’ implementation of EU asylum law, we expect that the 
ongoing  ‘communitarisation’  of  asylum  policy  will  help  to  improve  Member  States’ 
implementation records of EU asylum law and further strengthen refugee protection outcomes in 
Europe. The EU might have disappointed of some of those who had hoped that it would do more 
to address the shortcomings of the international refugee regime. However, the evidence presented 
in this paper has shown that that the effects of European cooperation on asylum and refugee 
matters have not been invariably and uniquely negative and that, in fact on balance, regional 
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